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Abstract. The vast majority of applications at this moment rely on centralized
servers to relay messages between clients, where these servers are considered
trusted third-parties. With the rise of blockchain technologies over the last few
years, there has been a move away from both centralized servers and traditional
federated models to more decentralized peer-to-peer alternatives. However, there
appears to be a trilemma between security, scalability, and decentralization in
blockchain-based systems. Deconstructing this trilemma using well-known threat
models, we define a typology of centralized, federated, and decentralized archi-
tectures. Each of the different architectures has this trilemma play out differently.
Facing a possible decentralized future, we outline seven hard problems facing
decentralization and theorize that the differences between centralized, federated,
and decentralized architectures depend on differing social interpretations of trust.
1 Introduction
Although there has been a move towards decentralization, projects with decentralized
architectures have had fundamental difficulties: Bitcoin and Ethereum seem to be un-
able to scale to as large a number of transactions as centralized systems such as Visa.
On the other hand, centralized projects are increasingly the subject of data leakage and
other attacks, calling their security into question. This has been phrased as the “decen-
tralization trilemma” by the co-founder of Ethereum, Vitalik Buterin, and is a widely
spread truism in blockchain development that has not been rigorously analyzed and
critiqued.1
Intuitively, there does seem to be fundamental trade-offs between decentralization,
scalability, and security as illustrated in Figure 1: Systems can be less decentralized
and more scalable versus more decentralized and less scalable. Indeed, decentraliza-
tion does seem like a trade-off against scalability, but most large real-world deploy-
ments of scalable software, such as Amazon, are actually distributed systems with large
trust assumptions and centralized co-ordination (DeCandia et al., 2007). Also, there are
secure centralized systems that use advanced encryption (such as the Signal instant
messenger), and decentralized systems that have been found to be insecure, as vari-
ous attacks on the distributed hash tables used by peer-to-peer file-sharing networks
show (Wolchok et al., 2010). Decentralization can be thought of as arising from a sep-
arate threat model than traditional security assumptions: A lack of trust in centralized
1 https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Sharding-FAQ
servers. In this paper, we outline the threat model, themalicious server, that these decen-
tralized architectures are trying to address in Section 2. Decentralization, which we de-
fine in terms of an adversarial approach to distributed systems (Troncoso et al., 2017),
is then explored in Section 3 as separate from classical security and scalability re-
quirements. Rather than a binary division, we view decentralization on a spectrum that
can be broadly construed as centralized, federated, and decentralized architectures in
Section 4, and we provide an analysis in Section 5. In Section 6 we outline six open
problems that decentralized systems face in meeting the requirements currently met by
centralized architectures. In our conclusion in Section 7, we reassess decentralization
and turn to the social hypothesis at the heart of decentralization.
2 The Malicious Server
In distributed systems, all entities are considered to be capable of sendingmessages (Lamport et al., 1982).
In centralized systems, users do not directly receive messages but are mediated by a
client (a device, a program such as a mail-reader or a browser, etc.) where the client
communicates to a server that stores and forwards messages to the client. As exempli-
fied by cloud computing, this server is assumed to be always online. One of the primary
advantages of centralized servers seems to be that the deployment and upgrading of any
protocol is easier via the usage of a centralized server.
Fig. 1. The decentralization trilemma
As the server mediates all messages, the server is a trusted third party. Central-
ized systems can be secure and maintain privacy against even powerful adversaries.
Secure messaging applications ranging from Signal to WhatsApp, depend on central-
ized servers (Unger et al., 2015). In the case of secure messaging protocols, even if the
message content is encrypted, the server is usually necessary for delivery, especially
if the client is offline. As shown by the simple case that messages are assumed not
be dropped by the server, the security and privacy properties of centralized servers are
dependent on a single root of trust.
Under the adversary model of malicious security, trusted components of a larger
distributed process may no longer follow the protocol and so no longer maintain their
security properties (Yung, 2015). To achieve malicious security, the protocol must work
even with a component no longer maintains its security properties. Although originally
aimed at cryptographic primitives, malicious security also applies at the level of the
entire architecture of a system. In particular, a malicious server is one that no longer
securely relays messages according to the protocol.
We theorize that the goal of decentralization is to achieve protocols with malicious
security in the face of any component, and so also achieve resistance in terms of the
byzantine failure of components, where components behavior is unrestricted, and so
may bemalicious or “unintentionally” faulty (such as being offline) (Lamport et al., 1982).
Given the popular deployment of servers in computing protocols, amongst all possible
components, the primary threat model of decentralization is a malicious server, where
the server is untrusted. Malicious security can be achieved in a decentralized protocol
simply by not relying on a server at all. Malicious servers are a real-world adversary:
As the revelations by Edward Snowden showed that it was trivial to compromise the se-
curity of e-mail if they were not end-to-end encrypted by simply retrieving the cleartext
from the centralized server. Even if the message content is encrypted, “metadata” such
as the time and recipients of the message, often has no legal protection from surveil-
lance (Slobogin, 2014).
The goal of a malicious server in the centralized client-server setting is to read
messages and possibly forge the message content of one or more clients. Even if the
message is encrypted, the malicious server may be “honest but curious” and so also has
the goal of determining the identity of the senders and recipients of messages, i.e. the
discovery of the “social graph” of the communication. The server may use techniques
like droppingmessages, replayingmessages, or sending fakemessages to identify users.
The server is local, it does not have the ability to observe the entire network, but can
observe everymessage it relays, and so differs from threat models like the global passive
adversary that can observe all messages in an entire network or an adversary that can
arbitrarily corrupt any component in the system. The malicious server may be a mobile
adversary and so the corruption of the server may be limited in duration (Yung, 2015).
Before cloud computing, servers were generally viewed as trustworthy andmessage-
passing between them governed primarily by standardized protocols such as SMTP and
HTTP, leading to federated systems. Although the servers were generally regarded as
trusted rather than malicious in early federated internet architectures, issues such as
spam and a need for payments led to increased centralization. The pendulum is now
swinging in the other direction: It is our fundamental hypothesis that decentralized sys-
tems arose in response to the threat model of the malicious server. For example, Bit-
torrent came into usage after the the centralized index of Napster was eliminated, and
Bitcoin became popular after the centralized servers in classical e-cash schemes were
viewed as a liability after the “take down” of e-Gold (Troncoso et al., 2017).
3 Properties: Security and Scalability
Security and scalability are very broad notions. It is useful to decompose them into more
distinct and better known technical properties that can be enforced via cryptography and
engineering. The list of properties below is somewhat arbitrary, but reflects classical
distinctions within the fields of computer security and distributed systems.
3.1 Security Properties
A number of traditional of security properties are needed to counter a malicious server.
Security properties should be able to hold in terms of messaging even in the presence
of a malicious server, which is considered the “adversary” below:
– Confidentiality: The adversary cannot read the cleartext of any message.
– Integrity: The adversary cannot alter the message without detection.
– Authenticity: Only the intended recipient can receive and send the message (in order
to prevent replay and impersonation attacks by the server).
Although informally thought of as “security” properties in the decentralization trilemma,
we can consider privacy properties separately:
– Unlinkability: Each message of a client is unlinkable from any given other message
by the client or any other client (Pfitzmann and Hansen, 2005).
– Unobservability: A message cannot be distinguished from not sending amessage (Pfitzmann and Hansen, 2005).
3.2 Scalability Properties
Additional properties relate to the scalability of the system, and so can be contrasted
with security and privacy requirements (Das et al., 2018). A system should be able to
scale so it is both available to clients when needed, can support new clients, and deliver
messages within a period of time acceptable to the user.
– Availability: Messages can be sent or received by the client when requested.
– Capacity: New clients may be added at any time while maintaining availability.
– Latency: Messages may be sent by one client and received by another client within
an acceptable period of time.
Some requirements cannot be fulfilled by traditional cryptographic and engineering
requirements, as these related to the freedom of users, particularly when they are under
attack by a malicious server.
– Transparency:Messages or information aboutmessage-passing behavior are recorded
for clients to access.
– Portability: Messages may be send and received across all servers and clients, so
a user may move their messages to another server or send the message directly
themselves in case their server becomes malicious.
These properties are by no means exhaustive, but are meant to deconstruct and
ground the terms “security” and “scalability” in the decentralization trilemma in well-
accepted technical properties. There are more informal properties that can fit within
this framework. Take usability, which can be defined as the ability to easily retrieve and
send messages by the user.
4 Decentralized Architectures
In order to minimize the damage a malicious server could cause, decentralization is
put forward as an alternative architecture to trusted third parties. However, there are
multiple variations of architectures claiming to be decentralized: For example, efforts
like Autocrypt claim that e-mail, despite involving a SMTP server, is decentralized.2
So defining and comparing these architectures in terms of messaging passing between
clients and servers is necessary. We divide the three primary architectural choices as
centralized, federated, and decentralized. These architecture were classically illustrated
by Baran in the following Figure 2 (Baran et al., 1964).3
Fig. 2. From left to right: (1) Centralized (2) Federated (3) Decentralized
4.1 Centralized
An architecture is strictly centralized if there is a single trusted third-party that mediates
all messages. Clients are restricted to a server. For example using a messaging service
such as WhatsApp, for any two users, all messages must be passed through the What-
sApp server. Slack, Facebook, Signal, Apple Payments, and other popular cloud-based
services are examples of centralized architectures.
2 https://autocrypt.org/
3 In his original work, Baran called these (1) Centralized, (2) Decentralized, and (3) Distributed,
but terminology has been changed to be consistent with current software architecture practice
where “federated” has a clear meaning in terms of a multiple authoritative servers with one or
more clients each, while the difference between “decentralized” and “distributed” in informal
modern parlance has become vague.
4.2 Federated
In the federated architecture, client may pass messages to different servers, and these
servers may communicate to pass messages between clients. This is the classical archi-
tecture of the early Internet, where users were often offline and so servers were nec-
essary. Open standards for protocols usually have this architecture, and so clients are
not restricted to a single server, as otherwise server-mediated communication between
multiple clients on different servers would be impossible. Taking e-mail for example,
the user operates a client known as the Mail User Agent (MUA) that sends mail via one
or more the Mail Transfer Agents (MTA, i.e. “email servers”) until reaching the recip-
ient’s server. This server in turn sends the mail to the recipient’s MUA. The security
of the e-mail eco-system at least assumes each of these channels is encrypted via TLS
(Foster et al., 2015). SMTP services such as Gmail are federated, as would be any ser-
vice using a standardized messaging protocol such as XMPP+OTR or even “federated”
or “permissioned” blockchains.
4.3 Decentralized
In the decentralized model – also a “peer to peer” (P2P) model) – clients may directly
communicatewithout a server, and so clients are considered “peers” (Minar and Hedlund, 2001).
In a peer-to-peer framework, clients may pass messages on behalf of other clients, al-
though they may also drop messages. Servers are not used. This naturally leads to a
default to broadcast messaging in peer-to-peer systems. Earlier systems like Bittorrent
as well as newer “permission-less” blockchain-based models fall into this category.
A proper subset of distributed systems that operate in an adversarial model are de-
centralized systems, which are “systems in which multiple authorities control different
components and no single authority is fully trusted by all components” (Troncoso et al., 2017)
As per malicious security (Yung, 2015), both centralized and decentralized parties may
no longer honestly follow the protocol, but may maliciously attempt to subvert the pro-
tocol: For example, a peer in a peer-to-peer system may drop traffic or claim falsely to
execute part of the protocol while not doing so.
Distributed ledgers, and implementations such as blockchains, allow components of
a system to record their activity transparently so that other peers can verify if compo-
nents are following the protocol andmalicious components detected (Halpin and Piekarska, 2017).
Distributed consensus protocols are then required to when the components need to have
a consistent global view of some part of the system (Lamport et al., 1982), such as a
distributed ledger of transactions. Distributed systems that do not require the quorum
be set in advance but allow any peer to join are permissionless, and so decentralized.
In contrast, if a quorum of existing members or other manual procedure is required to
allow a new peer to enter the system, then the manual procedure is a centralized root
of trust or the quorum of “trusted” peers equivalent to servers in the federated model in
practice.
5 Analysis
The decentralization trilemma4 states that a system can only have two of three in terms
of security, scalability, or decentralization but not all three. On one hand, a system
may be both secure and scalable, but not decentralized. Google and other cloud-based
services fit in this requirement. In contrast, a system may be decentralized and scalable,
but not secure. Systems such as Bittorrent fall in this category (Wolchok et al., 2010).
Finally, a system may be decentralized and secure, but not scalable. Blockchains such
as Ethereum and Bittorrent would be part of this category.
Federated systems attempts to balance the trilemma by having multiple servers,
but in reality this simply spreads the trust from one server to multiple servers. There-
fore, federated systems are not “trustless” and so not decentralized, even if they use a
blockchain. Some of the examples are subtle: Napster did use a peer-to-peer protocol,
but had a centralized search directory. So Napster would count as federated, as the cen-
tralized directory server was required for the function of searching torrents, and each
peer needs to connect to that server in order to function properly.
By tying the decentralization trilemma to concrete technical properties, we can de-
termine if it actually holds. Every architecture makes certain design choices that privi-
lege one property over another. Although more work is necessary in order to formally
characterize each of these architectures, history suggests that these architectures are
structurally biased toward certain properties and against others. Table 1 provides a com-
parison of the choices made by the architectures outlined above.
Property Centralized Federated Decentralized
Security and Privacy Properties
Confidentiality ✓ ✓ ✓
Integrity ✓ ✓ ✓
Authenticity ✗ ✗ ✓
Unlinkability ✗ ✗ ✓
Unobservability ✗ ✗ ✗
Scalability Properties
Availability ✓ ✓ ✗
Capacity ✓ ✗ ✗
Latency ✓ ✓ ✗
Transparency ✗ ✗ ✓*
Portability ✗ ✓ ✗
Examples: Apple Pay, Signal Visa, E-mail (PGP) Bitcoin, Bittorrent
Table 1. Properties compared to architectures (* assumes a distributed ledger)
4 https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Sharding-FAQ
5.1 Security Analysis
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Authenticity In general, all architectures are able to
implement classical security properties using cryptography. However, authentication
is a problem also for all architectures, albeit in different ways. Centralized architec-
tures have low authenticity insofar as a user can only communicate to other users via
a server and a server could serve false keys or impersonate its users, as is possible
even with Signal (Kobeissi et al., 2017). This critique also applies to federated servers,
although out-of-band finger-print verification may help, despite users often being un-
able to use fingerprint verification to detect a man-in-the-middle attack by a malicious
server (Schro¨der et al., 2016). Peer to peer systems suffer from similar issues, as key
discovery can be easily manipulated by a malicious peer. However, decentralization
at least allows direct communication of key material and non-custodial key owner-
ship, and so decentralized systems have an advantage as a (possibly malicious) server
is not required to mediate key material. Also, decentralization requiring each client
to serve as a peer leads to an inability to cover certain use-cases, as security prop-
erties need to be enforced over groups, but each peer is meant to be an individual.
Security operations over groups are more well-defined but much less commonly de-
ployed (Chaum and van Heyst, 1991). For example, Bitcoin has issues with large group
signatures and secure group messaging is still considered a hard problem, even in cen-
tralized environments (Goldberg et al., 2009).
Privacy: Unlinkability and Unobservability Without advanced techniques like dif-
ferential privacy or secure multi-party computation, centralization has low unlinkability
insofar as the malicious server can link any of its users to messages and can always map
the network of a user via observing their messages. Likewise for authenticity issues in
centralized systems, and the same is possible in federated settings. Decentralized sys-
tems by design can offer possibly more privacy as it is less trivial for a central server
to monitor all transactions, although not without cost. For example, even Tor is vulner-
able to traffic analysis attacks on the exit and entrance nodes. (Dingledine et al., 2004).
Some decentralized designs allow a high amount of unlinkability, using techniques like
zero-knowledge proofs such as ZCash (Ben-Sasson et al., 2014) and unobservability
via the use of cover traffic (Clarke et al., 2000), although these designs are not widely
deployed. The problem is cover traffic and other techniques to increase anonymity
come at the cost of reducing the capacity of the network, as given by the well-known
“anonymity trilemma” between capacity, latency, and anonymity (Das et al., 2018).
5.2 Scalability Analysis
Availability, Capacity, and Latency Scalability concerns the reliable operations of
the system in the face of growing demand. Due to their use of robust distributed (but
not decentralized) systems, centralized architectures are highly available and can eas-
ily scale to having a high capacity with low latency (DeCandia et al., 2007). Federated
systems have as a bottle-neck the server with the least capacity (similar to decentralized
systems). In most decentralized architectures, availability is low as peers may always be
offline. Although federation may be a disadvantage in terms of unlinkability in compar-
ison to decentralized systems, federated systems typically havemuch higher availability
than decentralized designs as the server is normally online while peer-to-peer systems
suffer from network churn. This tends to translate into lower latency in comparison
to decentralized systems. In centralized systems, it is much easier to upgrade capac-
ity via simply upgrading servers and connection capacity. In decentralized systems, the
problem of the “weakest” link of capacity can be profound, particularly if there is no
way to route around low capacity peers. Therefore, real-world decentralized systems
like Bittorrent tend to evolve “super-nodes” that have high capacity and are online.
These “super nodes” in effect emerge as de-facto “servers” in the decentralized sys-
tem (Wang and Kangasharju, 2013), undermining the security and privacy properties of
decentralized systems and making them de-facto federated systems.
Transparency and Portability Centralized and federated servers whose code and op-
erations are hidden from their users on a server are difficult for third parties to audit by
their users, and so transparency is low. Decentralized systems offer less ability for an
adversary to tamper with incoming messages as the malicious server has been elimi-
nated insofar as messages may be directly sent from user to user, although in practice a
relaying peer may tamper with the messages. For example, Bittorrent has no transparent
log, and so nodes dropping packets cannot be easily detected.
Although decentralization gets rid of a malicious server, clients may join and act
maliciously in a sybil attack (Douceur, 2002). Therefore, blockchain technology re-
quires enforcing transparency in a decentralized setting so attacks and failures by peers
can be discovered. In terms of portability, decentralized systems suffer from a dearth
of interoperable standards, while federated systems are highly standardized (e-mail,
XMPP, etc.). The usability of most peer-to-peer systems tend to be poor, while federated
systems such as email have been able to compete in terms of usability with centralized
systems.
6 Open Problems
Our analysis leads to a number of open problems exist that prevent the further develop-
ment of decentralized alternatives. Some of the disadvantages of decentralization can
be solved by standardization in order to bring the portability of decentralized architec-
tures in competition with well-known federated protocols. Better usability is desper-
ately needed to drive more users from centralized to decentralized systems. Some of
the characteristics of architectures could be changed by technical advances: For exam-
ple, increased usage of cover traffic could help address unobservability when combined
with mix networking (Danezis et al., 2010). Yet some problems are more fundamen-
tal. In surveys of secure communication (Unger et al., 2015), a pattern starts to emerge:
Any serious attempt to build a decentralized alternative that is resistant to a malicious
server eventually comes up against similar hard problems.
It is possible to ignore many of these problems if one rules out one of these prop-
erties, but users have grown accustomed to contemporary methods of online commu-
nication based on silos (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) that are easy to use and have high
availability, as well as assume a level of authenticity that is normally not justified by the
difficulties of trusted key discovery in centralized systems. So, decentralized architec-
tures that are designed to defend against malicious servers should find solutions to the
“seven hard problems” as follows:5
1. Public key discovery problem: Public key discovery and validation is very diffi-
cult for users to manage in a decentralized system, but without it a message cannot
have authenticity.
2. Key Availability problem: Users would like communicate seamlessly and securely
across different devices, as well as restore data if a device or key is lost.
3. Group problem: Users work in social groups, yet public key cryptography does
not have a consistent manner for dealing with groups in decentralized settings. This
effects confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity.
4. Metadata problem: Messages are vulnerable to traffic analysis, unless cover traffic
is used, which is not common in decentralized systems. This derives from issues
around unlinkability and unobservability.
5. Sybil problem: Without servers, any client may join a decentralized network and
act maliciously in a sybil attack (Douceur, 2002).
6. Update problem: Software updates need to be securely delivered across multiple
clients in a decentralized system, which is easy to do with a centralized server.
7. Resource problem: It is an open problem on how to let users securely share a
resource for real-time collaboration in a decentralized architecture.
These problems cause real-world impact on interest in decentralized architectures
both by users and researchers. New standards like IETF Message Layer Security seem
to be allowing encrypted user communication to tackle the group problem, but it is not
clear how to apply to decentralized systems.6 The update problem is partially addressed
in terms of security by reproducible builds. The resource problem in part is due to the
group problem being unsolved in tandem with scalability issues, where decentralized
designs have a lack of availability and latency that make sharing a single resource be-
tween a group difficult.
7 Conclusions
The decentralization trilemma is a simplification that can be deconstructed into tra-
ditional security and scalability properties. Nonetheless, decentralization solves a real
problem: Decentralization prevents a single centralized malicious server from compro-
mising the security of users. There is a kernel of truth in the decentralization trilemma:
In broad strokes, decentralization does offer better security at the cost of scalability if
end-users manage their keys and can offer higher scalability if sacrificing security is
acceptable. Nonetheless, decentralized systems naturally have scaling issues as nodes
are more frequently off-line or faulty. Worse, communication can require more hops
than in centralized systems, increasing the chance of failure.
5 An earlier version of this list was originally defined at LEAP:
https://leap.se/en/docs/tech/hard-problems
6 https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/mls/
The real breakthrough in blockchain technology, in comparison to earlier peer-to-
peer decentralized systems, is the use of distributed ledgers to prevent malicious behav-
ior by peers via transparency. This naturally leads to loss of latency due to the nature
of distributed consensus protocols (Lamport, 1978). Blockchain technology, while not
solving the fundamental issues around availability that plague decentralized systems,
does allow malicious servers to be removed and malicious peers to be detected, and
could lessen the security problems caused by “super nodes.” If peers could be ubiqui-
tously online, they should be more available, which may increase capacity and decrease
latency. Yet to do so securely would mean the network would reach widespread usage
and users would be highly security-conscious, which appears delusional as most users
are not systems administrators.
The low availability of decentralized architectures likely necessitates learning lessons
about the evolution of “super-nodes” (high capacity nodes that relay the majority of the
traffic) in peer-to-peer architectures, which can act as high availability relays and so
bring the benefits of federated designs to decentralized systems. In order to secure these
“super-nodes,” it does seem to make sense that a specialized class of system adminis-
trators would arise in federated systems.
Thus, the technical problem of decentralization is revealed at its core to be a polit-
ical problem: Centralization to a large extent arises due to the monopoly of technical
knowledge by a class of system administrators and programmers. The goal of decen-
tralized systems seems to be to spread this technical knowledge so that all users can
autonomously operate and govern their own infrastructure. In this way, federated and
centralized models represent the inherent trust assumptions of non-technical users. His-
torically, humans typically trust friends and associates, as well as deploy a specializa-
tion of labor. So a user would likely trust a highly-skilled individual they know in some
fashion, perhaps a friend or affiliate at a human-scale institution like a university, to
manage technical infrastructure on their behalf. The rise of a non-profit federated sys-
tems at the dawn of the Internet maps to pre-existing human trust relationships. As the
technical complexity of the Internet scaled and users needed more convenience, this
model shifted as users trusted Google to handle the sheer technical complexity in return
for profit off of personal data or for a certain cost. The lack of trust in these central-
ized servers and the humans behind them is what led to the rise of peer-to-peer and
blockchain: Decentralization is a political ideology masquerading as a technical archi-
tecture.
The next steps to explore this thesis would require formalizing properties such as
availability, latency, and capacity in a more rigorous manner than presented here, simi-
lar as what has been done in research on privacy (Das et al., 2018). Then architectures
could be compared with the same rigor as security properties within a formal message-
passing framework as done by the pi-calculus (Kobeissi et al., 2017). Another promis-
ing avenue is using network-theoretic approaches to study the evolution of decentralized
networks into super-nodes. Further socio-technical work in needed in understanding the
motivations, usability, and political stakes of decentralization. The ideology of decen-
tralization has given us very real advances in technology for ordinary users, but much
more is needed for liberation.
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